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THE FIRST QUEER RIGHT
Scott Skinner-Thompson*
The First Amendment and LGBT Equality: A Contentious
History. By Carlos A. Ball. Cambridge and London: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 2017. Pp. 284. $39.95.
Introduction
Contemporary discussions about lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer rights often center around the need for equality for LGBTQ individu-
als.1 If one is a Justice Anthony Kennedy acolyte, then perhaps dignity too.2
On the other hand, current legal disputes may lead one to believe that the
greatest threat to LGBTQ rights is the First Amendment’s protections for
speech, association, and religion, which are currently being mustered to
challenge LGBTQ antidiscrimination protections.3 But underappreciated to-
day is the role of free speech and free association in advancing the well-being
of LGBTQ individuals in American society, as explained in Professor Carlos
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I am grateful for the
opportunity to have discussed Professor Carlos Ball’s book, The First Amendment and LGBT
Equality, with him at a book event at the New York University Bookstore on April 27, 2017,
and more broadly for the mentorship Professor Ball has provided. Thanks to James Castle and
Matthew Simonsen for tremendous research assistance that helped inform this Review, and to
Michael Boucai, Charlie Gerstein, Ben Levin, Kate Levine, Helen Norton, Russell Robinson,
and Carlos Ball himself for penetrating feedback.
1. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Carcaño v.
McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-236) (asserting equal protection
and constitutional informational privacy claims against North Carolina’s HB2 targeting trans-
gender individuals).
2. Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 Calif. L. Rev. Cir.
117, 117 (2015), http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
Joshi_Respectable_Dignity.pdf [https://perma.cc/25ZJ-NC26] (tracing the importance of dig-
nity to Justice Kennedy’s constitutional rights jurisprudence).
3. See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining
whether law prohibiting the provision of gay conversion therapy to minors by state-licensed
mental health professionals regulated protected speech or conduct); Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015) (determining whether Colorado’s antidis-
crimination law compelled a cake baker to speak by requiring him to bake a cake for a same-
sex wedding), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M.
2013) (evaluating whether New Mexico’s public accommodation protections based on sexual
orientation infringed on a wedding photographer’s First Amendment free speech and free
exercise rights).
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Ball’s important new book, The First Amendment and LGBT Equality: A
Contentious History.4
As methodically detailed by Ball, in many ways the First Amendment’s
protections for free expression and association operated as what I label “the
first queer right.” Decades before the Supreme Court would recognize the
importance of equal treatment of same-sex relationships5 or the privacy
harms implicated by criminal bars to same-sex intimacy,6 the Court pro-
tected the ability of queer people to espouse explanations of their identities
and permitted them leeway to gather together to further explore and elabo-
rate those identities.7 In this way, the First Amendment served an important
incubating function for the articulation of equality and privacy arguments
in favor of LGBTQ individuals while it simultaneously created space for
greater visibility of queer people in American society.8 As we now know,
social contact or exposure to stigmatized identities plays a major role in
helping destabilize and correct prejudicial attitudes.9
According to Ball, it is critical to bear in mind the First Amendment’s
historical pedigree in advancing LGBTQ rights when confronting current
4. Distinguished Professor of Law and Judge Frederick Lacey Scholar, Rutgers Univer-
sity School of Law.
5. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (declaring unconstitu-
tional state bans on same-sex marriage as violating equal protection); United States v. Wind-
sor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (overturning portions of the Defense of Marriage Act as
violating equal protection).
6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (deeming criminal sodomy statutes
unconstitutional invasions of privacy and liberty).
7. See, e.g., One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam) (summarily reversing
lower court ruling that had upheld the Post Office’s refusal to distribute a gay political and
literary magazine), rev’g 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
8. As Nan Hunter has uncovered, the relationship between expression- and identity-
based claims is an intimate one—and the two theories of legal protection can work in tandem,
rather than in conflict. Cf. Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: To-
ward Anti-Orthodoxy and Inclusion, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1671 (2000). To properly balance expres-
sive and equality interests, Hunter has encouraged us to understand queer rights cases as often
asserting what she labels “expressive-identity” claims on behalf of queer people. Nan D.
Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 1
(2000). By recognizing that queer people’s expressive and identity interests are implicated by
efforts to exclude queer individuals, the “expressive-identity” framework proffered by Hunter
suggests that antidiscrimination laws protecting queer people should be enforced notwith-
standing a purported competing expressive interest in exclusion when an identity’s expressive
force derives from the same processes of social construction as the identity itself, unless forced
inclusion would also jeopardize the identity of the group seeking to exclude. Id. at 20.
9. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex and the Constitution: Sex, Religion, and Law
from America’s Origins to the Twenty-First Century 508 (2017) (arguing that the most
important factor in the Supreme Court’s changing attitudes “was the profound change in the
visibility of gays and lesbians in American society”); Scott Skinner-Thompson et al., Marriage,
Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 Colum. L. Rev. Online 126, 134 (2016), http://columbi-
alawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Skinner-Thompson.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AK2-
SKSU] (explaining that visibility of gay and lesbian people on popular media programs had a
“softening effect” on negative attitudes towards LGBTQ people).
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controversies over whether certain religious adherents should be able to as-
sert expressive, associational, or religious objections to employing or serving
LGBTQ individuals in the marketplace. As Ball rightly observes, America has
been down this road before—those resistant to racial equality raised similar
arguments in opposition to federal antidiscrimination laws.10 Courts and
legislatures were able to strike an appropriate balance that ensured race
could not be used to discriminate—even by religious individuals who ob-
jected to integration.11 But religious organizations were still permitted to
discriminate in favor of their religious devotees when it came to employ-
ment decisions, preserving their associational and religious rights.12 For Ball,
more or less the same balance should be struck when adjudicating (or legis-
latively resolving) the current controversies over, for example, whether a flo-
rist or baker who happens to have a religious objection to same-sex marriage
should be able to refuse service to a same-sex couple for their wedding.13 In
a nutshell, private citizens and corporations in the marketplace should not
be able to discriminate,14 but not-for-profit religious organizations should
be granted more space to exercise First Amendment values.15 This Review
largely agrees with Ball’s proposed balance between antidiscrimination and
First Amendment values. And Ball’s careful explanation of the First Amend-
ment’s historical role in protecting marginalized groups is critical context
10. See, e.g., chapter 5. And the First Amendment similarly enabled advocacy for those
race-based antidiscrimination laws. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466
(1958) (protecting membership list of NAACP under freedom of association); Harry Kalven,
Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 96–97 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988)
(describing First Amendment challenges brought by civil rights activists).
11. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam)
(describing as “patently frivolous” the argument that under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 a public accommodation could refuse service to black patrons based on the defendant’s
religious objections); cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(holding that Title II is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012) (exempting from Title VII’s coverage any “religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities”).
13. See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 568 (Wash. 2017) (holding, in a
unanimous opinion, that a state antidiscrimination law requiring public accommodations not
to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation did not infringe on the speech, exercise, or
association rights of a florist who wanted to refuse service for a same-sex wedding), petition for
cert. filed, No. 17-108 (U.S. July 21, 2017).
14. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2585 (2015) (explaining that complicity-
based conscience claims, such as those by merchants seeking to refuse service to couples for
same-sex marriages, impose material and dignitary harms on the third-party customers and
undermine pluralism values).
15. This truly is a “nutshell,” and Ball’s prescription for how to balance LGBTQ equality
claims with the First Amendment interests of religious objectors to LGBTQ rights, comprehen-
sively outlined in Part II of his book, is much more nuanced and draws from Ball’s identifica-
tion of five characteristics that American antidiscrimination law has historically used to
successfully balance religious freedom and antidiscrimination laws. Pp. 250–66.
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for understanding the current (purported) tension between LGBTQ rights
and First Amendment rights.
But at the same time, the story Ball paints of the First Amendment as
“the first queer right” somewhat elides the rhetorical impact the initial focus
on the First Amendment had on how queer identities were conceptualized
and framed. Ball provides little in the way of comparative analysis discussing
how LGBTQ identities were portrayed to take advantage of the First Amend-
ment relative to how they were later portrayed when trying to take advan-
tage of the Equal Protection Clause (though he does examine why,
doctrinally, the First Amendment was initially more fertile ground for les-
bian, gay, and bisexual people than equal protection). In short, an argument
can be made that when LGBTQ rights were being pursued under the First
Amendment, litigants crafted a broader, more comprehensive and diverse
tableau of queer identity. This was in part because plaintiffs were not en-
couraged to place themselves within a particular socially constructed cate-
gory (e.g., gay or lesbian) or contend that they were the “same” as straight
people in order to obtain equal treatment, as arguably required by equal
protection doctrine.16
In other words, the First Amendment not only provided the first doctri-
nal foothold for LGBTQ individuals, as Ball artfully highlights, but also may
have facilitated a more robust and wide-ranging articulation of queer iden-
tity than the more vaunted equality claims that followed. One unfortunate
side effect of transitioning from First Amendment claims to equality-based
claims was the narrower, straighter picture of queer such claims presented.17
Like the doctrinal history chronicled by Ball, the narrative history of how
LGBTQ rights were framed and conceptualized under the First Amendment
is important to contemporary debates about LGBTQ rights because it sug-
gests that the First Amendment may yet have important work to do on be-
half of LGBTQ rights—it could still be used as a means to further expand
social understandings of sexuality and gender identity.18 This is not to sug-
gest that the doctrinal shift from First Amendment to equal protection
wholly explains the more static picture of queer identity that emerged as the
16. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“[S]ame-sex couples are situated identically to opposite-sex couples in terms of their ability to
perform the rights and obligations of marriage . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693
(2013).
17. Cf. Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 Yale L.J.F. 136, 141, 153 (2015), https://
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/perfect-plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/8X7A-QJB7] (explaining
that the thirty individual plaintiffs involved in the Obergefell Supreme Court case largely re-
flected “heteronormative and traditional characteristics” instead of centering “diverse and
complex” kinds of queer families).
18. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (holding that a transgender female student’s desire to dress in female
clothes was protected expressive conduct likely to be understood by others because “by dress-
ing in clothing and accessories traditionally associated with the female gender, she is expres-
sing her identification with that gender” and that the “plaintiff’s expression is not merely a
personal preference but a necessary symbol of her very identity”).
April 2018] The First Queer Right 885
movement evolved; a host of factors likely contributed to that change.19
Rather, the doctrinal change may have, at the very least, facilitated and rein-
forced the more traditional trajectory of the movement. This in turn sug-
gests that the First Amendment may prove to be a more nimble and
dynamic instrument for exploring queer identity going forward.
The Review expands this argument in three Parts. Part I provides a con-
densed account of the history unearthed by Ball, highlighting the First
Amendment’s formative role in establishing legal protections for LGBTQ in-
dividuals. Simultaneously, Part I foregrounds how First Amendment legal
frameworks, particularly free expression doctrine, enabled a relatively capa-
cious understanding of different queer identities and the sexual and political
conduct that may accompany them.
Part II contrasts the narratives and themes employed by the early free
expression cases with the more circumspect and traditional narratives ad-
vanced on behalf of LGBTQ people in the equality jurisprudence that fol-
lowed. This Part offers original research, examining the complaints in
roughly ninety same-sex marriage cases, involving around 600 plaintiffs,
pending in the months before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell
made same-sex marriage the law of the land.20
Finally, Part III suggests that the First Amendment still has important,
affirmative work to do on behalf of LGBTQ individuals. In particular, be-
cause of the shift away from expression and toward equality, some of the
labor that the First Amendment could have done to protect queer sexuality
and gender remains unfinished. I suggest that renewed attention on the First
Amendment as a means of advancing LGBTQ rights may be warranted.
I. The First Amendment As Formative
Before queer people could make any claims to equality, they had to have
the right to makes claims at all. They also needed the ability to associate and
organize. And so, as Ball diligently narrates, litigation during the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s under the First Amendment proved to be a critical first
order of business under what Justice Antonin Scalia would later deem “the
homosexual agenda.”21 Put differently by Ball, the First Amendment and
subsequent equality guarantees are “inextricably linked,” with the First
19. See Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 Yale
J.L. & Human. 1, 80–81 (2015) (gesturing toward manifold political, social, and economic
explanations for the more conservative trajectory of marriage advocacy, including increased
reticence in response to antigay backlash, the impact of the AIDS epidemic, and the growth of
elite-funded organizations, among many others).
20. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
21. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying the
majority opinion decriminalizing same-sex sexual conduct as “the product of a law-profession
culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the
agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium
that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct”).
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Amendment “laying the groundwork for the initial articulation of equality
claims and the later attainment of equality objectives.”22
Ball analyzes three principal categories of LGBTQ First Amendment liti-
gation. The first centers on free speech challenges to obscenity law. Indeed,
as Ball explores, the first two LGBTQ cases to ever be considered by the
Supreme Court were challenges to government efforts to censor publications
discussing gay and lesbian subject matter as violating obscenity laws
(pp. 36–41). In One, Inc. v. Olesen,23 the Court summarily reversed censor-
ship imposed by the Postmaster of Los Angeles, who refused to distribute
“One, The Homosexual Magazine,” which was dedicated to “dealing prima-
rily with homosexuality from the scientific, historical and critical point of
view.”24 The volume at issue contained, among other items, a story of a
lesbian successfully attempting to court another woman and a poem discuss-
ing sex between males at public toilets.25
Then, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, the Court held that the publi-
cation of nude or near-nude male models in so-called “physique magazines”
targeted toward gay male audiences could not be regulated as obscene even
though they appealed to gay men’s prurient interest because they were not
patently offensive.26 After these two cases, “the government could not censor
a publication dedicated to exploring the place of sexual minorities in soci-
ety,” nor could it punish publication of gay erotic material that did not meet
the general definition of obscenity.27
The second category centers on freedom of association. In cases ranging
from prohibitions on gay bars to refusal to recognize queer student groups,
from the 1950s to 1970s, courts began to recognize the right of LGBTQ
people to congregate, socialize, and organize for the purpose of expressing
their opinions (pp. 62–82). Importantly, often the opinions being expressed
were in opposition to laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct.28 And
22. Pp. 4–5; see also Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1695,
1695 (1993) (explaining that, as of 1993, “the First Amendment has provided the most reliable
path to success of any of the doctrinal claims utilized by lesbian and gay rights lawyers”); cf.
Ruthann Robson, Dressing Constitutionally: Hierarchy, Sexuality, and Democracy
from Our Hairstyles to Our Shoes 68 (2013) (explaining that First Amendment claims
offered a more robust form of challenging gendered clothing regulations in the 1970s).
23. 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
24. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1957), rev’d per curiam, 355 U.S. 371
(1958).
25. Id.
26. 370 U.S. 478, 489–91 (1962).
27. Pp. 38–45; see also A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Plea-
sure” v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (overturning lower court conclusion that
erotic novel Fanny Hill, which included depictions of some same-sex sexual activity, was ob-
scene); Gay Men’s Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (striking the
CDC’s restrictions on grant funds toward “offensive” AIDS-related educational materials as
unconstitutionally vague).
28. See, e.g., Gay All. of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 164 (4th Cir. 1976) (describ-
ing the gay student organization as a “political organization advocating a liberalization of legal
restrictions against the practice of homosexuality”).
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sometimes mere demands for the right to socialize were challenged by the
state as leading, inexorably, to same-sex sexual contact and then conduct,
which was still illegal in many jurisdictions.29 But, as Ball insightfully notes,
courts often relied on the paper-thin distinction between status and con-
duct30 to uphold the rights of queer people to both gather together socially
and gather together to oppose antisodomy laws notwithstanding that sexual
conduct was still prohibited (p. 81). Despite in some ways problematically
reifying the status-conduct distinction, the free association cases neverthe-
less provided queer communities further opportunity to orient courts and
society to their sexualities and their (desired) sexual conduct.31
For example, in one of the cases discussed by Ball, Gay Alliance of Stu-
dents v. Matthews, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to accept that
the school’s recognition of the gay student organization would facilitate both
opposition to laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct and, potentially,
through dances and other social events, subsequent sexual conduct.32 But, to
the court, refusal to recognize the student group was “overkill” above and
beyond the then-permissible criminalization of the actual sexual conduct.33
In short, the court was forced to consider the likelihood that homosexuals
are inclined to, in fact, act on their sexuality, but nevertheless it protected
the First Amendment rights of queer students to come together.
Similarly, in Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals confronted “expert” evidence proffered by the University of Mis-
souri suggesting that formal recognition of gay student groups would “per-
petuate” homosexual behavior, asserting that “wherever you have a
convocation of homosexuals, [then] you are going to have increased homo-
sexual activities which, of course includes sodomy.”34 The court looked these
claims straight in the eye and concluded that even if the expert opinions
were accepted “at face value,” a prior restraint on the students’ freedom of
association was unwarranted.35
The third category of cases revolves around free speech challenges by
public employees who had been fired for coming out of the closet
29. P. 81; see, e.g., Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st
Cir. 1974).
30. See, e.g., Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 970–71 (Cal. 1951) (holding that just be-
cause “persons of known homosexual tendencies” gathered at a restaurant, that did not neces-
sarily mean that the restaurant was being used for same-sex sexual conduct).
31. Bonner, 509 F.2d at 660 (holding that a gay student organization’s “efforts to organ-
ize the homosexual minority, ‘educate’ the public as to its plight, and obtain for it better
treatment from individuals and from the government thus represent but another example of
the associational activity unequivocally singled out for protection in the very ‘core’ of associa-
tion cases decided by the Supreme Court”).
32. Pp. 81–82; Gay All. of Students, 544 F.2d at 166.
33. Gay All. of Students, 544 F.2d at 166.
34. P. 82; Gay Lib v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 1977).
35. Gay Lib, 558 F.2d at 854.
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(pp. 92–112). While not uniformly successful,36 as Ball notes, there were
nevertheless important civil servant/public employee victories (p. 100). For
example, in Acanfora v. Board of Education, a school removed a gay school
teacher from his classroom and then refused to renew his contract after he
publicly acknowledged and discussed his sexual orientation with several me-
dia outlets.37 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the school had
violated the teacher’s First Amendment rights but nevertheless prevented
him from being returned to the classroom, concluding that his failure to
disclose on his application that he had helped found a gay student group
while in college was fraud.38
Following on Acanfora, in Aumiller v. University of Delaware, a federal
district court concluded that firing a professor for speaking out to local
newspapers about life as a homosexual in a predominately heterosexual soci-
ety ran afoul of the First Amendment.39 As summarized by Ball, both the
Acanfora and Aumiller decisions “rejected the view that a person’s disclosure
of his same-sex sexual orientation was beyond the protection of the Free
Speech Clause.”40
Critically, the public employee cases reflect, at least in broad strokes, a
judicial recognition of the relationship between identity, social context, and
expression. That is, certain identities within a hegemonic cultural setting
can, in and of themselves, take on a political expressive valiance41—one that
36. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that a public school guidance counselor’s revelation that she was bisexual was a private
matter not of public concern and therefore adverse employment action against her was per-
missible under the First Amendment).
37. 491 F.2d 498, 499–500 (4th Cir. 1974).
38. Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 499.
39. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
40. P. 109; see also Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (hold-
ing that dismissal of a gay public employee who intended to address county legislative body as
to why gay antidiscrimination protections should be passed violated the First Amendment).
That said, there is a more recent line of decisions suggesting that government employees can
be disciplined for their off-duty speech because the speech reflects poorly on the government
entity. As noted by Helen Norton, such cases raise the specter that “absent any limiting princi-
ples, certain individuals may be unemployable for many government jobs purely because of
their unpopular or controversial off-duty expression—for example, marching in a gay pride
parade.” Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 6 (2009).
41. See Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979)
(“Consequently one important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce homosexual
individuals to ‘come out of the closet,’ acknowledge their sexual preferences, and to associate
with others in working for equal rights.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid
of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship,
1961–1981, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 817, 905 (1997) (“The insight implicit in those [First Amend-
ment gay rights] rulings was that, for gays and lesbians, identity speech (‘I am gay’) was both
personal and political.”); Nancy J. Knauer, “Simply So Different”: The Uniquely Expressive
Character of the Openly Gay Individual After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 89 Ky. L.J. 997,
1001 (2001) (arguing that because of heteronormative social structures, openly gay individu-
als’ identity operates as both expressive and politicized).
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may be entitled to First Amendment coverage.42 As discussed in more detail
in Part III, there is still opportunity for the First Amendment to deepen
judicial understanding of identity and social context, providing protections
to a broader variety of queer identities, including gender nonconforming
and genderqueer people.
As highlighted by Ball, these three categories of cases (obscenity, school
association, and public employee coming out cases) in many ways created
the conditions for increased visibility of queer people in American society
and paved the way for the expression of equality demands that would follow.
But equally important is that they compelled, or at the very least facilitated,
consideration of the sexual and political components of queer identities by
courts and the American public. As the next Part discusses, in the equality
claims that followed, sex and politics are largely removed from the equation,
and a narrower picture of gay and lesbian identity was constructed.
II. Equal Protection as Restrictive
As queer rights litigation unfolded, equal rights (with an emphasis on
equal rights for same-sex couples)43 gradually evolved into the rallying cry,
supplementing (and arguably supplanting) the role of expression.44 Of
course, equality as a legal principle and human right has been critical to the
recognition of queer people’s humanity.45 But perhaps in reaction to both
the strictures of equal protection doctrine and conventional impact litiga-
tion wisdom regarding the need for upstanding plaintiffs,46 LGBTQ-rights
litigation often emphasized LGBTQ conformity, rather than queerness.
42. This is not to say that when queer people are present, their presence automatically
interferes with or alters the expression of a particular group or association, justifying exclusion
of the queer person in the name of protecting the First Amendment rights of the association.
In other words, the context where a group is deemed to have an organizational message that
could be interfered with by the presence of a disfavored group member must be narrowly
hemmed. Not every association has an organizational message on a given topic, and to hold
otherwise would completely dismantle antidiscrimination law, permitting any public accom-
modation or employer to claim an expressive interest in excluding a group member. Put differ-
ently, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), was wrongly decided, in part,
because it is far from clear that the Boy Scouts of America had an organizational message that
was interfered with by the presence of Dale, a gay scout leader. See Erwin Chemerinsky &
Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 595, 600–01
(2001) (arguing that the Boy Scouts decision reflects a flawed methodology for determining an
association’s expressive message).
43. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 Colum. J. Gen-
der & L. 236, 239–40 (2006) (lamenting the shift within the movement toward the primacy of
the couple and legal recognition for that couple in the form of marriage rights).
44. See pp. 233–34 (observing that marriage equality emerged as a movement priority in
the 1990s).
45. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (overturning bans on same-
sex marriage because they deny gay, lesbian, and bisexual people “equal dignity in the eyes of
the law”).
46. Cf. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 396 (Vintage Books 2004) (1975) (discussing
Oliver Brown’s qualifications to be lead plaintiff in Brown v. Board of Education as including
his “lack of militancy,” his veteran status, and his role as assistant pastor at a local church);
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Judith Butler’s question “Which version of lesbian or gay ought to be ren-
dered visible, and which internal exclusions will that rendering visible insti-
tute?” was answered in a very particular way—one that may have instituted
public erasures of its own.47
Augmenting Ball’s history of the LGBTQ-rights movement and the shift
from expression to equality (p. 1), this Part highlights research demonstrat-
ing that same-sex marriage plaintiffs were still portrayed in largely conserva-
tive terms even after the Windsor decision in 2013 overturned the Defense of
Marriage Act, when the writing was largely on the wall for state bans on
same-sex marriage.48 The research centers on an examination of the roughly
ninety cases (involving around 600 plaintiffs) pending in the months leading
up to the Obergefell decision in 2015.49 Time after time, plaintiffs’ religion,
military service, and professionalism were emphasized.50 That is, rather than
exploring queer difference or queer sexuality or emphasizing the ways in
which queerness intersects with and magnifies other forms of marginaliza-
tion, the equal protection challenges emphasized sameness, painting a cir-
cumscribed portrait of queer identity.51
The named, lead plaintiffs in the Supreme Court’s two most important
marriage equality decisions exemplify this trend, but they’re hardly unique.52
Both Edie Windsor and Jim Obergefell were white, middle- to upper-class,
professionals, and widowed.53 Windsor in particular has been held up by
Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 31–32 (2005) (discuss-
ing the critical role of plaintiff selection).
47. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in The Lesbian and Gay Stud-
ies Reader 307, 311 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
48. Portions of this research are teased in an earlier piece. See Scott Skinner-Thompson,





51. Cf. Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 1065,
1107–24 (observing that arguments in favor of LGBT equality in family planning have empha-
sized access to assisted reproductive technologies at the expense of discussions regarding queer
family difference).
52. Franke, supra note 43, at 239 (noting that the embrace of marriage equality as the
queer rights issue after Lawrence has entailed the parading of “model homo families—our
perfect plaintiffs—before the media” and, at times, “what feels like the deployment of children
as props that attest to our normalcy”); Godsoe, supra note 17, at 145–51 (in a review of the
pleadings for the thirty plaintiffs involved in the consolidated cases that would compromise
the Obergefell case, finding that the plaintiffs were routinely described as all-American, asexual,
accidental activists, often with children front and center); Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigat-
ing the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 21, 33 (2010) (documenting how
the first “successful same-sex marriage cases were carefully orchestrated to select plaintiffs in
long-term, committed, marriage-like relationships, whose personal narratives appealed to
middle America”).
53. See, e.g., Edie & Thea: A Very Long Engagement (Bless Bless Productions 2009)
(describing Windsor’s friend group as “upper-middle class” with some “upper class”); Skin-
ner-Thompson, supra note 48.
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many attorneys associated with the LGBTQ-rights movement as emblematic
of why gay rights matter. According to her attorney, Roberta Kaplan,
“[t]here is no one individual who better personifies the concept of equal
protection than my client, Edie Windsor.”54 Other movement leaders echoed
these sentiments.55
Undeniably, the inspirational Windsor suffered as a result of the federal
government’s refusal to recognize her marriage to Thea Spyer, with whom
Windsor had been partnered for over forty years upon Spyer’s death after a
long battle with multiple sclerosis.56 And nothing said here is meant to di-
minish the pain associated with the federal government’s refusal to recog-
nize their relationship. But the concrete harm that Windsor suffered as a
result of the Defense of Marriage Act was hardly representative of queer
people (or America generally). Because the federal government would not
recognize her marriage to Spyer, Windsor had to pay $353,053 in estate taxes
that she otherwise would not have paid when Spyer passed.57 Perhaps put-
ting Windsor’s rarefied economic status in relief, when discussing the hard-
ships of her tax bill, Windsor lamented that she had to stop parking her car
in Manhattan to save the $4,000 a year in parking she had been paying.58
This was no accident. As Roberta Kaplan candidly recognized when re-
counting her discussions with movement attorneys about whether Windsor
was the best plaintiff or whether, for example, a plaintiff who was going
through bankruptcy might be a better vehicle for challenging DOMA,
Kaplan told the other attorneys, “Really? I don’t want to be disrespectful or
classist, but do you really think that people who couldn’t pay their personal
debts are the best people to bring this claim?”59 In other words, Kaplan, the
ACLU (which served as Kaplan’s co-counsel), and eventually other move-
ment attorneys (some of them reluctant), embraced Windsor as the chosen
personification of the LGBTQ community.60
54. Edith Windsor Statement on Supreme Court Steps – Full Text, Guardian (Mar. 27,
2013, 1:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/27/edith-windsor-supreme-
court-statement-text [https://perma.cc/6HE2-6JBP].
55. Marc Solomon, Winning Marriage: The Inside Story of How Same-Sex
Couples Took on the Politicians and Pundits—and Won 239–40 (2014) (observing that
Windsor was a “compelling plaintiff” who suffered an “unambiguous” injustice); see also
Kenji Yoshino, Speak Now: Marriage Equality on Trial 250 (2015) (stating that Wind-
sor’s facts “could hardly have been more sympathetic”).
56. Complaint at paras. 2–3, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 10 Civ. 8435 (BSJ)) [hereinafter Windsor Complaint].
57. Id. at para. 5. A truly intersectional, social justice perspective might have
foregrounded a broader injustice and critiqued the massive concentrations of wealth in the
United States. Indeed, in some ways the litigation legitimized broad estate-tax exclusions
rather than engaging in a class-based critique of hereditary wealth accumulation. (I’m grateful
to Ben Levin for this point.)
58. Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife, New Yorker (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife [https://perma.cc/QG9T-FN3T].
59. Id. Kaplan also claimed that Windsor’s appearance in pink lipstick and pearls made it
easier for people across the country to feel that “she embodied values they could relate to.” Id.
60. Id.
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In addition to promoting a plaintiff whose legal injury was admittedly
unrepresentative from a class perspective, litigators also frequently took steps
to de-emphasize the sexual components of same-sex relationships.61 For ex-
ample, while the Windsor complaint foregrounds her class, it downplays
Windsor and Spyer’s sexuality and goes to extraordinary lengths to hide the
butch-femme dynamic in their relationship.62 Other than emphasizing that
Edie and Thea loved to dance together,63 the complaint makes no mention
of the couple’s sexuality or sexual dynamics. In fact, Roberta Kaplan specifi-
cally instructed Windsor not to talk publicly about sex, commenting that
“[a]ll I needed was Antonin Scalia reading about Edie and Thea’s butch-
femme escapades.”64 In an interview with The New Yorker magazine after the
Supreme Court’s ruling, Windsor is more forthcoming, stating that “[i]f I
didn’t have nice breasts, Thea and I never would have gotten together” and
that “I never wanted anybody inside me till Thea. And then I wanted her
inside me all the time.”65 As it happened, Windsor hated when others re-
ferred to Spyer as her wife because it feminized Spyer.66 Windsor was the
wife. But none of these dynamics were on display for the courts. They were
carefully hidden. Windsor was “remade as a non-threatening little old
lady.”67
The fact that both Windsor and Obergefell were also widowed further
enabled courts to avoid confronting their sexuality.68 Indeed, as Noa Ben-
61. Levit, supra note 52, at 43 (“Some of the stories in the equal protection realm seem to
have succeeded in litigation by erasing sexuality.”); see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551, 1641 (1993) (arguing that liti-
gators should not erase the sexual conduct from their client’s stories and observing that there
is a degree of “absurdity [in] making legal arguments in favor of gay and lesbian rights that
ignore sex”); Teresa M. Bruce, Note, Doing the Nasty: An Argument for Bringing Same-Sex
Erotic Conduct Back into the Courtroom, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1135, 1166 (1996) (arguing that
“a gay-rights jurisprudence that depends for its vigor on an excision of erotic conduct from
sexual orientation may have harmful long-term effects” and suggesting that litigators include
more discussion of same-sex sexual intimacy in their pleadings).
62. See Windsor Complaint, supra note 56, at paras. 21–22, 29–30 (describing how
Windsor and Spyer danced together the entire night they first met and how they later bought a
beach house and traveled the world).
63. Id. at paras. 21–22.
64. Levy, supra note 58. Evidently, Windsor disagreed with this strategy. See Roberta
Kaplan, Elegy for Edie, Slate: Outward (Sept. 16, 2017, 6:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/outward/2017/09/16/roberta_kaplan_s_eulogy_for_edie_windsor.html [https://perma.
cc/UL8U-UZFJ] (explaining that Windsor disagreed with the prohibition on discussing sex
even after learning that Justice Sotomayor had deemed it a smart strategic move).
65. Levy, supra note 58; see also Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis
of the Legal Homosexual, 37 Harv. J.L. & Gender 243, 272 (2014) (documenting the desexual-
ization of Windsor and Spyer).
66. Levy, supra note 58.
67. Id.
68. Godsoe, supra note 17, at 147; cf. Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public
Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va. L. Rev.
1643, 1644 (1993) (“[W]hen pair bonding and copulating can be, as it were, decoupled, courts
generally react favorably to the pair bond and negatively to copulation. Courts accord the most
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Asher has discussed, the Windsor decision itself does not use the words “ho-
mosexual,” “lesbian,” and “bisexual” at all to the describe the couple—
Windsor and Spyer are described with reference to their sex (“two women”)
and not their sexuality (“two lesbians”).69 Likewise, in Obergefell, the intro-
ductory description of three of the plaintiff groups also refrains from identi-
fying anything about the plaintiffs’ sexuality (though there is subsequent
discussion of gays and lesbians, but not bisexual people).70
Cynthia Godsoe’s important work has highlighted how the narrow, and
arguably conservative, tableau of people engaged in same-sex relationships
was commonplace among the thirty individuals involved in the Sixth Circuit
lawsuits that would comprise the Obergefell Supreme Court case.71 Not only
were these plaintiffs stripped of their sexuality, but they were also routinely
stripped of their politics—frequently depicted as “accidental activists,”72 in
contrast to the early First Amendment cases, which foregrounded LGBTQ
groups agitating for recognition and asserting that queer identity was, itself,
political.73 But those trends extend well beyond the thirty Obergefell
plaintiffs.
A broader review of same-sex marriage challenges pending in the
months before the Supreme Court considered Obergefell, the majority of
which were filed post-Windsor decision, reveals similar portrayals.74 These
challenges encompass around ninety cases and approximately 600 plaintiffs.
favorable treatment to those gay men and lesbians involved in close, long-term relationships
from which the sexual aspect has perforce been removed due to the death, illness, or imprison-
ment of one of the members of the couple.”).
69. Ben-Asher, supra note 65, at 262.
70. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–96 (2015).
71. Godsoe, supra note 17.
72. Id. at 150.
73. See supra Part I; see also p. 140 (describing the in-your-face, confrontational protests
that characterized AIDS activism under the First Amendment).
74. The cases were identified primarily through reliance on a list of pending cases com-
piled and made publicly available by Lambda Legal, but supplemented to the extent the author
or research assistant became aware of additional cases not included in Lambda’s running list.
A spreadsheet analyzing the demographics of the plaintiffs, as described in the complaints, is
available at https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=0&article=1697&
context=mlr&type=additional (on file with the Michigan Law Review). The spreadsheet notes
where the description of plaintiffs is based on something other than the complaint itself.
Where possible, amended complaints were also incorporated into the spreadsheet. The spread-
sheet aims to be as accurate as possible, but as with any large-scale coding project, mistakes are
inevitable.
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Plaintiffs are routinely characterized as “same” or mainstream,75 and other-
wise depicted as “productive members of society.”76 Many were members of
the military or law enforcement agencies.77 Plaintiffs were frequently white-
collar professionals.78 In reality, LGB individuals face higher rates of poverty
than heterosexual people, in part as a result of the lack of uniform employ-
ment and housing discrimination protections.79
The marriage plaintiffs’ Christianity and religiosity were also often high-
lighted.80 Moreover, the plaintiffs were disproportionately female and par-
ents—roughly 63 percent were female and 36 percent male. In general,
about 51 percent of same-sex couples are female.81 Of the male plaintiffs,
75. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, Love v. Pence, 47 F.
Supp. 3d 805 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (No. 4:14-cv-00015) (“[T]he Love Plaintiffs are no different
from other Indiana couples who wish to be married.”); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunc-
tive Relief at 12, Zahrn v. Perry, No. 1:13-cv-00955 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2013) (plaintiffs “are
like any other typical American couple”); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
15, Harris v. Rainey, No. 5:13-cv-00077 (W.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2013) (“Plaintiffs are residents of
the Commonwealth who experience the same joys and challenges of family life as their hetero-
sexual neighbors, co-workers, and other community members who freely may marry.”).
76. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911
F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) (No. 2:12-cv-00578) (“Plaintiffs are productive, contributing
citizens who support their families and nurture their children . . . .”); Complaint for Declara-
tory and Injunctive Relief at 15, Harris v. Rainey, No. 5:13-cv-00077 (W.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2013)
(literally describing the plaintiffs in the exact same terms: “Plaintiffs are productive, contribut-
ing citizens who support their families and nurture their children . . . .”).
77. See, e.g., Brief of Ninety-Two Plaintiffs in Marriage Cases in Alabama et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1a–21a, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No.
14-556) (in one paragraph descriptions devoted to each couple, foregrounding plaintiffs’ vet-
eran status from United States Air Force, Army, Navy, and National Guard and emphasizing
those that work as police officers or correctional officers).
78. See, e.g., id. (noting that various plaintiffs “are professionals in the private financial
sector,” a “Dean and professor of Spanish Literature,” a “forensic nurse,” a “small business
owner,” a “CPA” that “serves as the chief financial officer,” a “pharmacist,” an “engineer,” an
“endodontist,” an “attorney,” a “clinical psychologist,” etc.).
79. See M.V. Lee Badgett et al., The Williams Inst., New Patterns of Poverty in
the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Community 1–3 (2013), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.
edu/wp-content/uploads/LGB-Poverty-Update-Jun-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/36UY-NK5E].
80. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Whitewood v. Wolf,
992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (1:13-cv-1861) (“Deb and Susan are devout Christians
and they and their children are members of and actively involved in the Christ United Meth-
odist Church of Bethel Park. Deb is the president of the Altar Guild, which prepares the
church’s communion, cares for the sanctuary and holy items, and decorates for the holidays.
A.W. and K.W. are in the church choir and sing every Sunday. A.W. is also in the Youth Praise
band, which sings contemporary Christian songs at church and at community perform-
ances.”); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 3, Ky. Equality Fed’n v.
Beshear, No. 13-CI-1074 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 2013) (“Both men attend Church, where they
have been active members of the congregation for several years. Mr. Rogers sings in the choir,
helps with the care ministry, and teaches Sunday school.”).
81. Gary J. Gates, The Williams Inst., Demographics of Married and Unmarried
Same-Sex Couples: Analyses of the 2013 American Community Survey 4 (2015), http://
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Demographics-Same-Sex-Couples-ACS20
13-March-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR3U-528S].
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about 26 percent of the couples had children, whereas, on average, a smaller
percentage of male couples are raising children.82
Equally important is what same-sex couples were not. Virtually none of
the complaints emphasize or mention whether any of the plaintiffs are HIV-
positive, notwithstanding that in 2015 about 86 percent of new HIV diagno-
ses among male adults and adolescents in the United States involved trans-
mission via male-to-male sexual contact,83 and about 70 percent of all adult
and adolescent diagnoses involved male-to-male sexual contact.84 Put differ-
ently, gay and bisexual men make up over half of the 1.1 million people
living with HIV in the United States, notwithstanding that they make up
under five percent of the total population.85 (Of course, while HIV dispro-
portionately impacts men who have sex with men, more than 90 percent of
men who have sex with men (MSM) are HIV-negative, and queer male
identity and HIV should not be fused or conflated).86 Nor is there mention
82. Id. at 6 (observing that among all same-sex couples only 8 percent of the male
couples are raising children under age eighteen, with only 17 percent of married male couples
are raising children); see also Gary J. Gates, Family Formation and Raising Children Among
Same-Sex Couples, Nat’l Council on Fam. Rel., https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Gates-Badgett-NCFR-LGBT-Families-December-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2GCJ-WPJQ] (noting that “[a]nalyses of the 2008 General Social Survey suggest that 19% of
gay and bisexual men” have had children).
83. See 27 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV Surveillance Report 18
tbl.1a(2015), https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/library/reports/surveillance/cdc-hiv-surveillance-re
port-2015-vol-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8HN-Y644] (showing that of 32,422 male adults or
adolescents, 26,376 were in the “male-to-male sexual contact” transmission category and 1,202
were in the “male-to-male sexual contact and injection drug use” category); see also W. David
Hardy, An Introduction to the Medical Aspects of HIV Disease, in 5 AIDS and the Law
§ 1.07[A] (Scott Skinner-Thompson ed., Supp. 2017) (“Male-to-male sexual contact is the
most frequently reported mode of HIV transmission in the United States.”).
84. 27 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 83, at 6.
85. See HIV Among Gay and Bisexual Men, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/group/msm/index.html [https://perma.cc/CHB6-
6638] (“More than 600,000 gay and bisexual men are living with HIV in the United States.”);
HIV in the United States: At a Glance, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Oct. 11,
2017), https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/overview/ataglance.html [https://perma.cc/S9VD-
H46K] (“1.1 million people in the US are living with HIV . . . .”).
86. Russell K. Robinson & David Frost, The Afterlife of Homophobia, 60 Ariz. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2018) (“[I]dentity as an MSM is also a weak proxy for being HIV positive.”);
Fujie Xu et al., Men Who Have Sex with Men in the United States: Demographic and Behavioral
Characteristics and Prevalence of HIV and HSV 2 Infection, Results from National Health and
Nutrition Examination Study 2001-2006, 37 Sexually Transmitted Diseases 399 (2010);
Scott Skinner-Thompson, Bad Blood: The FDA’s Donation Rule Change for Gay and Bisexual
Men is Sending the Wrong Message on HIV, New Republic (May 19, 2015), https://newrepub
lic.com/article/121847/blood-donation-policy-change-gay-and-bisexual-men-falls-short
[https://perma.cc/S39P-QRD8] (explaining that the FDA’s blood donation restrictions for men
who have sex with men wrongly suggest that gay and bisexual men are somehow uniquely at
risk for HIV).
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of any of the plaintiffs being transgender.87 Bisexuality is nowhere men-
tioned.88 And indeed, the orientation or sexuality of hundreds of the plain-
tiffs is not explicitly mentioned at all.
But there was nothing inevitable about these portrayals.89 That is, while
certain components of equal protection doctrine and conventional plaintiff-
selection wisdom both militate toward conservative, conforming depictions
(and in that way, reinforce each other),90 there was arguably a path forward
that both complied with the elements of equal protection law and depicted a
broader view of the queer community. Equal protection doctrine relies in
part on the creation and articulation of categories of people.91 And, in many
ways, the identification of queer categories (gay men, lesbians, transgender
people) has served liberating functions that have helped people feel that
their experiences and feelings are intelligible and legitimate.92 Indeed, even
Butler, who has helped us understand the risks and violence of identity cate-
gories, recognizes their instrumental, short-term political value.93 But in em-
bracing new identity categories, as the equality framework seems to
87. Cf. Chase Strangio, Can Reproductive Trans Bodies Exist?, 19 CUNY L. Rev. 223
(2016) (documenting the many ways transgender people are excluded from and made not to
exist in certain spaces and within certain discourses).
88. See Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisex-
uality, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 415, 452 (2012) (critiquing the virtual invisibility of bisexuality
from the same-sex marriage litigation and arguing that a critique of same-sex marriage bans as
infringing on sexual liberty would capture the true injury of the bans, including the injury to
bisexuals who are compelled and deterred into particular, restrictive relationships); Nancy C.
Marcus, Bridging Bisexual Erasure in LGBT-Rights Discourse and Litigation, 22 Mich. J. Gen-
der & L. 291, 300 (2015) (discussing the “absence of (acknowledged) bisexual parties in im-
pact litigation and a general lack of reference to bisexuals in briefs and court filings addressing
LGBT rights”).
89. Indeed, as Michael Boucai has painstakingly detailed, the early, Stonewall-era gay
marriage cases were part-and-parcel of more radical, transgressive, and transformative social
change efforts, with a focus on liberation rather than rights. Boucai, supra note 19.
90. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption
and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 Yale L.J. 485 (1998) (observing that because strict
scrutiny is unlikely to be granted if a particular characteristic is mutable or made invisible,
equal protection doctrine encourages sameness and assimilation for groups unlikely to receive
protection where their defining traits can be altered or concealed).
91. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in The Lesbian and Gay Studies
Reader, supra note 47, at 45, 57 (noting that claims for equal protection posit homosexual
persons “as a particular kind of person”—a category of people entitled to Constitutional
protections).
92. Id. at 55 (while questioning the oppositional structure of gay and straight identities,
recognizing that “substantial groups of women and men under this representational regime
have found that the nominative category ‘homosexual,’ or its more recent near-synonyms,
does have a real power to organize and describe their experience of their own sexuality and
identity . . . . If only for this reason, the categorization commands respect”); cf. Edward Stein,
Marriage or Liberation? Reflections on Two Strategies in the Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights
and Relationship Recognition, 61 Rutgers L. Rev. 567 (2009) (suggesting that the movement
may not need to choose between marriage and a more pluralistic litigation strategy).
93. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in The Lesbian and Gay Stud-
ies Reader, supra note 47, at 307, 308–09.
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necessitate, was there a way within equal protection doctrine to soften the
edges of those categories so that they too did not exclude?94 At the very least,
could the representative plaintiffs reflect different dimensions of identity
within the queer community? Intrepid—and successful—litigation on behalf
of incarcerated, black, female, transgender plaintiffs suggests so.95 Indeed,
the litigants in Lawrence v. Texas, who were an interracial pair (one black,
one white), both had criminal records.96 They nevertheless succeeded in hav-
ing bans on sodomy declared unconstitutional at the Supreme Court. (That
said, the movement lawyers downplayed many of the purportedly less “re-
spectable” elements of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner’s lives and their
relationship).97
As Ball notes, equal protection jurisprudence also encourages plaintiffs
subject to a suspect classification to show that they are otherwise similarly
situated to others outside of the suspect class.98 Relatedly, there is authority
suggesting that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the suspect characteristic
94. As Dean Spade has explained,
The invention of various categories of proper and improper subjects is a key feature of
disciplinary power that pervades society. The creation and maintenance of such catego-
ries of people (e.g., the homosexual, the criminal, the welfare dependent mother, the
productive citizen, the gifted child, the psychopath) establish guidelines and norms. . . .
These norms and codes of behavior reach into the most minute details of our bodies,
thoughts, and behaviors. The labels and categories generated through our disciplined
behavior keep us in our places and help us know how to be ourselves properly.
Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the
Limits of Law 54 (Duke Univ. Press 2015) (2009); see also Maggie Nelson, The Argonauts
86 (2015) (“Visibility makes possible, but it also disciplines: disciplines gender, disciplines
genre.”).
95. See Settlement Reached in SPLC Case That Highlighted Plight of Transgender Prisoners,
S. Poverty L. Ctr. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2016/02/12/settlement-
reached-splc-case-highlighted-plight-transgender-prisoners [https://perma.cc/GNH2-D9KY]
(documenting successful litigation on behalf of Ashley Diamond that resulted in Georgia
changing its “freeze frame” policy that prevented many transgender inmates from accessing
needed hormone therapy).
96. David Oshinsky, Strange Justice: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas, by Dale Carpenter,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/books/review/the-story-of-
lawrence-v-texas-by-dale-carpenter.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (observing
that “[t]o some, Garner and Lawrence seemed a risky choice for this role” because “[b]oth
men had criminal records, and their ‘relationship’ added a racial element to the mix”).
97. See Shannon Gilreath, The End of Straight Supremacy: Realizing Gay Liber-
ation 78–79 (2011); Robinson & Frost, supra note 86.
98. Pp. 88–90. According to Ball, until recently most courts were unwilling to accept that
sexual minorities were, in fact, “ ‘similarly situated’ to heterosexuals in their abilities, charac-
ters and contributions to society,” preventing successful equality claims. P. 88. In contrast, the
First Amendment requires neutrality with regard to expressive content. P. 89.
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does not impair their ability to contribute to society.99 However, the neces-
sity of that requirement is hardly black-letter law.100 Nor was same-sex
couples’ ability to contribute routinely disputed by those who opposed
same-sex marriage.101 Even had it been a central issue, there are ways of
demonstrating that premise without, time and again, imprisoning gay peo-
ple behind a picket fence with the bedroom door slammed shut, shades
drawn.102 Put differently, nothing in equal protection doctrine suggests that
in order to be deemed capable of contributing to society and entitled to
equal protection, one needs to be, by way of example, a Christian military
member with children. The category of gayness need not have been so nar-
rowly and conservatively constructed. As civil rights leader Iván Espinoza-
Madrigal has put it,
There are many ways to approach the law. You can approach the law from
an academic or theoretical perspective. I approach the law through the lens
of survival . . . . Maybe it’s because I know from my own experience that
poverty, marginalization, and oppression can be messy. I know that the
struggle is real. And I would like to think that our rights and our equality
don’t have to wait for picture-perfect plaintiffs and clients.103
99. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (“Because
illegitimacy is beyond the individual’s control and bears ‘no relation to the individual’s ability
to participate in and contribute to society,’ official discriminations resting on that characteris-
tic are also subject to somewhat heightened review.” (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
485, 505 (1976))). The better view of the Cleburne line of cases is not that an equal protection
plaintiff needs to demonstrate that they can contribute to society, but only that the particular
characteristic at issue did not justify different treatment.
100. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (considering whether the group had
been subject to a history of discrimination, exhibited obvious or immutable characteristics,
and were politically powerless, but not considering their ability to contribute to society in
determining whether a suspect classification existed); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Consti-
tutional Law: Principles and Policies 700 (5th ed. 2015) (notably not listing ability to
contribute to society as one of the requirements for obtaining strict scrutiny review of a sus-
pect classification); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scru-
tiny for Gays, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1753, 1755 (1996) (same).
101. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that
“[w]e do not understand BLAG to argue otherwise” with regard to same-sex couples’ ability to
contribute to society), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Brief for Respondent, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556) (nowhere arguing that same-sex couples lack the
ability to contribute to society).
102. Levit, supra note 52, at 23 (“Even if an equal protection challenge depends on sub-
stantial similarity to a benefitted group, and even if lawyers want to architect the best possible
case, there may be ways to weave in compelling stories of more members of the community
than simply the ‘white picket fence’ plaintiffs.”).
103. Iván Espinoza-Madrigal ‘05, OUTLaw’s Alumnus of the Year, Discusses Civil Rights
Work, N.Y.U. L. (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ivan-espinoza-madrigal-out-
law-immigration-lgbt-rights [https://perma.cc/ZCV8-FWLE].
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And yet, as documented above, for better or worse, the emphasis on same-
ness and conformity began to dominate the equality discourse of queer
rights litigation—even after the landmark Windsor decision in 2013.104
While, in my view, there was opportunity even within the conformist
equal protection framework for more comprehensive depictions of queer
identity, in the next Part I analyze whether, in any event, the First Amend-
ment provides a more liberating advocacy framework.
III. The First Amendment’s Unfinished Business
In this final Part, I explore whether the First Amendment can pick up
where the equality litigation has left off and whether it has further work to
do in expanding—and deconstructing—society’s understanding of queer
identities. It builds off Ball’s important cautionary note that, in contesting
First Amendment challenges to LGBTQ antidiscrimination protections,
movement advocates must not erode the First Amendment safeguards that
protected LGBTQ identities in the first place,105 by articulating exactly how
the First Amendment might continue to play a positive role for queer com-
munities. In particular, this Part explores the First Amendment’s potential to
help advance the rights of nonnormative queer identities—including the
rights of genderqueer, gender nonconforming, transgender, and intersexed
people (among others)—and understand the importance of gender expres-
sion to the constitution of gender norms and sexual and gender identities
more broadly.
Identities—including sexual and gender identities—are dynamic.106 And
our “sexed” bodies are similarly dynamic—the product of biology and ge-
netics, yes, but also social forces that shape and construct our bodies and
104. Gilreath, supra note 97, at 70 (“[T]he sameness/difference approach requires
targeted minorities to become ‘like’ the majority in order to be seen as worthy of equal treat-
ment, often to such an extreme that the identity of the minority is completely blotted out by
the analysis.”).
105. P. 281. And there is a way to do so. As Tobias Wolff has explained, even assuming
that merchants may engage in expressive mediums, they themselves do not design the particu-
lar message requested by the customer. No reasonable person imputes the message on a wed-
ding photograph to the photographer, the icing message to the baker, or the billboard message
to the advertising company. It is rightly imputed to the person with control over the mes-
sage—the customer who paid for the message. Indeed, why would a customer pay a merchant
to spread the merchant’s own message? So understood, cases challenging LGBTQ antidis-
crimination laws on expressive grounds are quite distinct from Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, because in that case the organizers of a privately ar-
ranged parade—an inherently politically expressive activity—were required to include a group
that would alter their message. 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995). But importantly, it was their
message to control from the outset. In the merchant cases, merchants are not being forced to
alter their speech but are simply facilitating the customer’s. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Sym-
posium: Anti-Discrimination Laws Do Not Compel Commercial-Merchant Speech, SCOTUSblog
(Sept. 14, 2017, 10:25 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-anti-discrimina-
tion-laws-not-compel-commercial-merchant-speech/ [https://perma.cc/U86H-KPV5].
106. See Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter 1 (Routledge Classics 2011) (1993) (“Sex-
ual difference, however, is never simply a function of material differences which are not in
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identities.107 In turn, our outward facing identities contribute to the social
tableau and shape others’ identities. In the end, our identities say some-
thing.108 They say something personal, and often political.109 They are indi-
vidually expressive—even if partially (largely?) the product of social
forces.110
My contention is that the First Amendment can help society, and courts,
better understand these dynamics and the didactic relationship between per-
sonal identity and social context, particularly as it relates to queer identities.
A look at a few examples of First Amendment litigation challenging the reg-
ulation of queer identity shows how. While this litigation often receives less
attention than the equality-based marriage litigation or efforts to protect
some way both marked and formed by discursive practices. Further, to claim that sexual differ-
ences are indissociable from discursive demarcations is not the same as claiming that discourse
causes sexual difference. The category of ‘sex’ is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault
has called a ‘regulatory ideal.’ In this sense, then, ‘sex’ not only functions as a norm, but is part
of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs . . . .”); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,
Queer and Now, in Tendencies 1, 7 n.6 (1993) (“[N]o matter what cultural construction,
women and men are more like each other than chalk is like cheese . . . .”); cf. One Mississippi:
Kiss Me and Smile for Me (Amazon online broadcast Sept. 8, 2017).
107. The categories of “man” and “woman” are, at bottom, “political categories and not
natural givens.” Monique Wittig, One Is Not Born a Woman, in The Lesbian and Gay Stud-
ies Reader, supra note 47, at 103, 105. And “our bodies as well as our minds are the product
of this [culturally imagined] manipulation.” Id. at 103.
108. Put differently by Butler, social construction is a “temporal process which operates
through the reiteration of norms” but “sex is both produced and destabilized in the course of
this reiteration.” Butler, supra note 106, at 10. That is, as a result of the reiteration of norms
and identities, “gaps and fissures” open up that permit destabilization of the norms. Id. And
while Butler is at times skeptical of individual volunteerism, she still seems to recognize a space
for subjective agency within the social grid/matrix. Id. at 15. Indeed, she seems hopeful of the
possibility that we can “work[ ] the weakness in the norm.” Id. at 181; see also Judith Butler,
Undoing Gender 3 (2004) (“If I have any agency, it is opened up by the fact that I am
constituted by a social world I never chose. That my agency is riven with paradox does not
mean it is impossible. It means only that paradox is the condition of its possibility.”).
109. See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Les-
bian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 973 (1989) (“The mere disclosure of one’s
gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity ineluctably accumulates political significance . . . .”); Bijal
Shah, Gay American “Deviance:” Using International Comparative Analysis to Argue for a Free
Speech and Establishment Clause Approach to Furthering Gay Marriage in the United States, 26
Wis. Int’l L.J. 1, 48 (2008) (explaining that in the Western context, expression is often consti-
tutive of identity).
110. As I’ve described elsewhere,
[A] post-structural theory of performative politics posits at least four things: (1) social
performances conjure and re-inscribe normative identities and values; (2) actions
(whether they be public assembly, drag, or, as I suggest, privacy demands) that deviate
from prevailing performances can be expressive forms of resistance separate and apart
from any linguistic utterance that may (or may not) accompany them; (3) these actions’
expressive value is derived, at least in part, from the fact that they are deviating from
prevailing social performances; and (4) the deviant actions’ expressive power is so great
that it can begin to erode, dismantle, or recraft the social structures to which they are
responding.
Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1673, 1692 (2017).
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LGBTQ antidiscrimination laws from First Amendment challenges, it is no
less critical and, in my view, has tremendous liberating potential, warranting
additional investment. Importantly, many of the cases discussed below have
been initiated by movement organizations, evincing their commitment to
further unpacking the First Amendment’s potential.
A. First Amendment Challenges to
Restrictive Government Identification Policies
Many jurisdictions have laws that greatly restrict or outright prohibit a
person from changing the gender marker on their birth certificate or driver’s
license.111 Transgender people and many gender nonconforming people are
exposed to discrimination and violence because of such laws, which may out
their nonnormative status to potential employers or anyone else who may
need to evaluate their identification.112 These laws infringe on queer people’s
right to informational privacy—to keep intimate information about them-
selves and their bodies private.113 And successful informational privacy chal-
lenges against such laws have been brought.114
But beyond the instrumental privacy harm, restrictive identification
laws also force—compel—people to embrace a gender and an identity that
do not reflect their reality.115 A recent Lambda Legal lawsuit challenging Pu-
erto Rico’s law restricting people’s ability to change the gender marker on
their birth certificate makes that very point (and also centers Latinx trans-
gender clients).116 While the law was also challenged on equality and privacy
grounds, by arguing that compelled affiliation with a particular gender con-
stitutes compelled speech,117 the lawsuit highlights that speech and identity
are often intimately linked, with self-identifying speech helping to construct
111. See Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accu-
rate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives
of Transgender People, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. 373, 400–01 (2013) (cataloguing jurisdictions
with a surgery requirement to change gender marker on birth certificates).
112. Spade, supra note 94, at 80 (explaining that inaccurate identity documents can out
and expose transgender people to discrimination).
113. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 159 (2015).
114. See, e.g., Love v. Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d 848, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2015); K.L. v. Alaska
Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, No. 3AN-11-05341 CI, 2012 WL 2685183 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012).
115. And, if the jurisdiction has a surgery requirement, it could compel the individual to
make material changes to their body that are unnecessary or unwanted. See Scott Skinner-
Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for Transgender Student Athletes, 28 Wis.
J.L. Gender & Soc’y 271, 291 (2013) (explaining that medical transition, including genital
surgery, is not necessary or medically indicated for many transgender people).
116. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 179, 215, Gonzalez v.
Nevares, No. 3:17-cv-01457 (D.P.R. Apr. 6, 2017).
117. Id. at paras. 174, 177.
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queer identities and gender norms, and with compelled identification disci-
plining and restricting those same identities.118 Moreover, to the extent such
lawsuits require courts to grapple with the fact that one’s gender identity
and expression may be divorced from certain biological components
(namely, external genitalia), these challenges have the potential to educate
courts about transgender, intersex, and gender nonconforming identities,
much as the early First Amendment obscenity cases forced courts to con-
front gay and lesbian sexuality (pp. 36–41).
B. First Amendment Challenges to Government Dress & Association Codes
Public school districts and government employers not infrequently im-
pose dress codes that restrict people’s ability to wear clothing that best re-
flects their gender or sexuality. These dress codes directly police gender and
sexuality. As explained by Ruthann Robson, “[a] major weapon of the gov-
ernmental maintenance of sexual hierarchies is the policing of attire.”119 For
example, one school punished a student and forbade him from wearing a t-
shirt containing a rainbow Ichthys—known popularly as the “sign of the
fish” or “Jesus fish,” a Christian symbol—and a slogan that says “Jesus Is
Not A Homophobe.”120 Another school prohibited a black transgender stu-
dent, who had been assigned a male sex at birth, from wearing a dress to
prom.121 In another example, a school refused to permit a male student to
bring another male to prom as his date.122 Each of these instances of govern-
ment regulation of clothing and association performatively reconstructing
gender and sexuality norms was successfully challenged as violating the First
Amendment.123
118. Hunter, supra note 22, at 1718 (“Self-identifying speech does not merely reflect or
communicate one’s identity; it is a major factor in constructing identity. Identity cannot exist
without it.”); cf. David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 319,
321–22 (1994) (explaining that homosexual conduct is expressive and that the expression
often serves as the government’s justification for regulation).
119. Robson, supra note 22, at 60.
120. Verified Complaint at 3, Couch v. Wayne Local Sch. Dist., No. 1:12-cv-00265-MRB
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2012); cf. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 636 F.3d 874 (7th Cir.
2011) (forbidding school from banning “Be Happy, Not Gay” t-shirt as protected First
Amendment expression).
121. Complaint, Logan v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:07-cv-431 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 12,
2007).
122. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980); see also McMillen v. Itawamba Cty.
Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 699 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (holding that a school violated lesbian
student’s First Amendment rights by forbidding her from bringing a female date to prom and
by forbidding her from wearing a tuxedo).
123. The Couch and Logan cases settled in the plaintiffs’ favor. See Judgment, Couch v.
Wayne Local Sch. Dist., No. 1:12-cv-00265-MRB (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2012); Press Release,
Lambda Legal Reaches Settlement Agreement with Indiana School District After Transgender
Student Was Barred from Prom, (Jan. 28, 2011), https://www.lambdalegal.org/news/
in_20110128_reaches-agreement [https://perma.cc/37ZT-6MXC]. The Fricke claim was re-
solved by a court. See Fricke, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980). But see Zalewska v. County of
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C. First Amendment Challenges to School Gender Classification Policies
In addition to clothing choices, students often have little control over
how their gender identities are classified—that is, whether they are deemed
“male” or “female.” Even in more open minded school settings, queer stu-
dents operate under a bureaucracy of what I call “identity by committee,”
meaning that students’ ability to be themselves in the educational setting is
regulated by a complex system including their parents, doctors, mental
health professionals, teachers, administrators, and school boards.124 With
each additional administrative step or hurdle, new people are incorporated
into the “committee,” amplifying the risk that sensitive information about
the students will be disclosed more broadly and decreasing students’ control
over their identities.
Some of these barriers may, in fact, be an unintended result of the way
that transgender identity has often been conceptualized—even by well-
meaning advocates—in order to take advantage of equality frameworks. For
example, does linking transgender identity with medicalized “gender
dysphoria” that can result from the distress caused by the difference between
one’s gender identity and one’s assigned gender—potentially to harness dis-
ability equality law or obtain medical benefits—lend credence to an ap-
proach where the parent and doctor, not the child, have control over the
child’s transition, given legal doctrine establishing parental supremacy over
medical decisions?125 Similarly, pursuant to the law’s recognition of parental
control over a child’s education, does an emphasis on the social aspects of
transition feed a parent’s ability to regulate the child’s transition at school,
even if the school and federal/state policy are supportive of the child?126
Conversely, would an emphasis on “gender expression” provide the child
with greater autonomy relative to their parents and the school, given law
endorsing students’ speech rights.127 At the very least, as with the other con-
texts discussed, it would seem that an emphasis on the dialectic dynamic
between social context and gender expression could help schools, courts,
Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting female public employee’s First Amend-
ment challenge to requirement that she wear pants because wearing a skirt did not convey a
particularized message).
124. Asaf Orr et al., Schools in Transition: A Guide for Supporting Trans-
gender Students in K-12 Schools 14, 35–37, 42 (Beth Sherouse ed., 2015), https://
www.genderspectrum.org/staging/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Schools-in-Transition-2015.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4XCA-GCAS].
125. See, e.g., In re Cassandra C., 112 A.3d 158, 159, 168–72 (Conn. 2015) (holding that
seventeen-year-old minor is not permitted to go against doctor’s orders and refuse
chemotherapy).
126. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
127. See Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children’s Right to Be Queer, 35 Cardozo L.
Rev. 425 (2013) (arguing that the First Amendment, along with equal protection and due
process, protect children’s right to be queer); cf. Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender
Expression as Protected Speech in the Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
89, 121–23 (2015) (suggesting that using a bathroom consistent with one’s gender identity
may be protected First Amendment expression).
904 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:881
and society better understand the nonessentialist (e.g., nonmedical) compo-
nents of our sexual and gender identities.
In each of these three contexts, nothing about the First Amendment
doctrine would militate toward painting a conforming picture of the plain-
tiff. On the contrary, the less conforming the plaintiff the stronger the argu-
ment that the nonconforming aspect of the plaintiff’s identity is expressive
and therefore entitled to First Amendment coverage. The deviation from
social norms is meaningful enough to communicate something external—
and, in certain instances, is being read as expressive by the government regu-
lator and regulated for that reason.128 Consequently, a renewed emphasis on
First Amendment litigation also has the potential to help LGBTQ movement
litigation—which has historically underfocused on transgender/gender
queer issues—to more prominently transgender identities.
Conclusion
Ball’s wonderful history of the First Amendment comes at a critical time
in the trajectory of LGBTQ citizenship and illuminates the importance of
First Amendment rights to LGBTQ rights. But it also gestures towards and
suggests an enduring role for the amendment in ongoing efforts for queer
enfranchisement. Given the First Amendment’s remaining emancipatory po-
tential for nonnormative sexual and gender identities, this Review’s demar-
cation of the Amendment as the first “queer” right (as opposed to gay right)
is quite intentional. The First Amendment, unlike the category-reliant Equal
Protection Clause, is arguably the first truly “queer” right because it has the
potential to facilitate and enable legally protected articulations of noncat-
egorized identities. And it also permits further, future contestation of those
very same “queer” identities. In other words, the First Amendment, like the
meaning of the word “queer” itself, begs for further discursive
contestation.129
128. See, e.g., Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 383 (principal denied ability of male to bring male
date fearing that it would be disruptive).
129. Cf. Butler, supra note 106, at 230 (observing that while “queer” is “necessary as a
term of affiliation,” it cannot “fully describe those it purports to represent,” requiring that we
“affirm the contingency of the term”).
